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My Response to Beyer and Bove
Richard C. Ausness*
Alexander Bove and Gerry Beyer were kind enough to read and
comment upon my article about discretionary trusts. I thank them for
the time and effort that they put into this assignment and I appreciate
the constructive and insightful comments that they made. Needless to
say, it is no small task to follow in the footsteps of the great Dean
Halbach.
When I read their comments, my first reaction was to say “Gee, I
wish that I had thought of that!” Between the two of them, Alexander
Bove and Gerry Beyer identified a number of areas that I should have
discussed or should have discussed more fully. These include certain aspects of support trusts, spendthrift trusts, child support discretionary
trust legislation, special or supplemental needs trusts, Medicaid planning
trusts and decanting. This is quite a long list and I can offer several explanations (not necessarily excuses) for only mentioning some of them
briefly or omitting others altogether. First, I was forced to limit my coverage of some of these topics to keep my article from becoming unreasonably long. For example, I collected a great deal of material on the
“other resources” issue associated with support trusts, but reluctantly
decided to leave most of it out to avoid excessive length. However, for
the record, I would be in favor of a rule that assumed that the settlor
would not want “other resources” to be taken into account unless he
said so expressly.
Another explanation for my giving some issues the short shrift has
to do with the way legal academics approach things. We tend to rely on
reported cases as a source of information about legal issues. In my case,
I was primarily interested in the standards courts used when they reviewed alleged abuses of discretion by trustees. Most of the case law on
this issue involved traditional types of trusts in which a trustee was given
the discretion to distribute trust assets to various beneficiaries. However, in doing so, as Bove and Beyer have observed, I failed to pay
enough attention to the role of discretion in more specialized types of
trusts, such as supplemental needs trusts. Instead, I focused on creditors’
rights issues because that’s where most of the reported cases were.
* Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Stites & Harbison Professor of Law,
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Professor Beyer rightly points out that I failed to discuss applicable
statutes in the area other than the Uniform Trust Code. Of course, the
first place a practicing lawyer would go to for guidance would be a statute. Indeed, in many states, legislatures have addressed many of issues
discussed in my article. However, academic writers tend to shy away
from analyzing statutes because they are sometimes difficult to find (unless someone else has already collected them) and because it is often
hard to generalize if the statutes do not fall into a common pattern.
Gerry Beyer also stated that I should have said more about the
interface between discretionary trusts and spendthrift trusts. This is an
excellent point and I wish that I had thought of it. Most of the cases and
law review commentary, including mine, focus on when a spendthrift
clause will protect a beneficiary’s interest against the claims of creditors.
However, as Beyer points out, most trusts, including discretionary trusts,
also have spendthrift provisions. It would have been helpful if I had
examined how, if at all, the two features interact with one another.
Alexander Bove suggests that I should have given more attention
to special needs or supplemental needs trusts that families sometimes
create to provide for their disabled children. He also mentions Medicaid
planning trusts which provide for the needs of elderly persons. According to Bove, these types of trusts are inherently discretionary and it
would have been useful to examine the sorts of trustee discretion issues
that may arise in connection with the administration of such trusts. Undoubtedly, this would have been an interesting and fruitful area to explore. Unfortunately, most of the cases involving special needs and
Medicaid planning trusts are concerned with the rights of the government and other creditors to reach the trusts’ property rather than the
nature of the trustee’s discretion. Nevertheless, it would be interesting
to see whether the discretion issue is handled any differently than it is in
other types of support trusts.
Alexander Bove also points out that I failed to discuss decanting in
any detail. He is absolutely right. Although legislation typically restricts
what kind of distributive provisions the new trust may have, the decision
to decant (or not to decant) always involves the exercise of discretion.
There is certain to be more litigation in the future on the issue of trustee
discretion as decanting becomes more common and affects substantive
as well as purely administrative provisions.
Alexander Bove also felt that my “own evaluation of the cases
would have been instructional.”1 That is a fair criticism and I will try to
at least partially respond to it now. Part III is concerned with the rights
1 See Alexander A. Bove Jr., Commentary on Discretionary Trusts: An Update by
Richard C. Ausness, 43 ACTEC L.J. 441 (2018).
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of beneficiaries. In the case of support trusts, courts are prone to uphold
a trustee’s exercise of discretion even when it seems to downplay the
legitimate needs of the trust beneficiary.2 In my view, when reviewing
the exercise of discretion in support trust cases when the settlor has provided little guidance, the court should take a more liberal view of the
trust’s support purpose and be more willing to overturn a trustee’s decision if it seems unduly tightfisted.3 Pure discretionary trusts are more
difficult to deal with because the discretion involved tends to be
broader.4 In such cases, it makes sense for the courts to give more deference to the trustee’s judgment unless the trustee has clearly acted
unreasonably.5
Turning to the issue of creditors’ rights, the trend appears to be
moving toward allowing certain favored classes of creditors to reach the
assets in support trusts in some cases.6 These creditors include spouses
and ex-spouses,7 as well as minor children8 of the beneficiary. Government creditors, on the other hand, have not fared so well.9 Some courts
have also shown a willingness to allow favored creditors to reach the
assets in a discretionary trust.10 My own view is that courts should respect the wishes of the settlor and not allow creditors of the beneficiary
to directly reach the assets of either a support trust or a discretionary
trust. If the settlor desires to benefit creditors of a beneficiary, he or she
is free to do so. However, in the absence of an express expression of
such intent, the courts (and legislatures) should refrain from treating the
assets of such trusts as a piggy bank for the benefit of ex-spouses and
even children of a beneficiary. This is particularly true in the case of
2 See, e.g., Laubner v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 898 N.E.2d 744, 751-52 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2008); Rogers v. Munsey, 164 A.2d 554, 556 (N.H. 1960); In re Trusts for McDonald, 953 N.Y.S.2d 751, 753-54 (App. Div. 2012).
3 See, e.g., Conlin v. Murdock, 43 A.2d 218, 220 (N.J. Ch. 1945); Stallard v. Johnson,
116 P.2d 965, 966 (Okla. 1941).
4 See, e.g., Hurtig v. Gabrielson, 525 N.W.2d 612, 614 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); In re
Ternansky’s Estate, 141 N.E.2d 189, 193 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
5 See, e.g., Rinker’s Adm’r v. Simpson, 166 S.E. 546, 549 (Va. 1932).
6 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 (AM. LAW INST. 2003); UNIF. TRUST
CODE § 504(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
7 See, e.g., Robison v. Elston Bank & Tr. Co., 48 N.E.2d 181, 189 (Ind. Ct. App.
1943); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 180 S.E. 70, 77 (N.C. 1935); but see Culver v. Culver, 169
N.E.2d 486, 489-90 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
8 See, e.g., Matthews v. Matthews, 450 N.E.2d 278, 282 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981).
9 See, e.g., Pohlmann ex rel. Pohlmann v. Neb. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Serv., 710
N.W.2d 639, 646 (Neb. 2006); but see Texas v. Rubion, 308 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tex. 1957).
10 See, e.g., Bacardi v. White, 463 So. 2d 218, 223 (Fla. 1985); Berlinger v. Casselberry, 133 So. 3d 961, 966 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); but see In re Watts, 162 P.2d 82,
88 (Kan. 1945); Doksansky v. Norwest Bank Neb. N.A., 615 N.W.2d 104, 109-10 (Neb.
2000); Kolpack v. Torres, 829 S.W.2d 913, 916 (Tex. App. 1992).
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discretionary trusts where a beneficiary has no legal claim against these
assets.
Finally, both commentators decried my failure to provide “practical
advice” on the issue of discretion to estate planners. Fortunately, they
have taken this task upon themselves so I will shamelessly adopt some
of their suggestions. Before doing so, however, let me explain why I did
not provide many practical tips to practitioners. As a student of trust
and estate law, I feel that I am qualified to comment on doctrine and
principles in this area. On the other hand, since I do not draft trust instruments or deal with clients on a daily basis, I feel that it would be
pretentious of me to “advise” others who do this sort of work for a
living.
Both Bove and Beyer emphasize that the drafter should determine
what the settlor’s intent is and incorporate it in the trust instrument.
Unfortunately, drafters apparently do not always identify various circumstances that may arise in the future or discuss the various options
that may be available to deal with them. In addition, too often drafters
fail to spell out the settlor’s intent in detail in the trust instrument, but
instead rely on boilerplate phrases, such as “comfortable maintenance
and support,” and leave it to the trustee or the court to figure out what
this language means. In this respect, Alexander Bove makes an excellent suggestion, namely that the drafter should assist the settlor to prepare a non-binding “letter of wishes”11 to provide the trustee with
additional information or instructions. Although the trustee would not
be bound by these instructions, a conscientious one would almost certainly take them into account when exercising discretion.
In conclusion, I am grateful of Gerry Beyer and Alexander Bove
for taking the time to read my article so carefully and for providing us
with the benefit their insightful comments.

11 Bove, supra note 1, at 445. See also Alexander A. Bove, Jr., The Letter of Wishes:
Can We Influence Discretion in Discretionary Trusts?, 35 ACTEC J. 38, 39 (2009).

